Now Reading: Irregular Migration: Dilemmas of Transnational Mobility by Jordan and Duvell

Jordan and Duvell's book formulates their research problem in terms of paradoxes to be solved or explained or transcended. A key paradox is that of mobility vs. membership. Mobility here refers to the interest of migrants to move out of their countries of origin and move into their chosen destinations. Rights advocates would elevate this interest into a right. Even Jordan and Duvell acknowledge that (economic) migration is a kind of "voting with the feet" or the "exit option", i.e., an exercise of a kind of a right to choose which kind of life to lead or which kind of polity/society to belong to (i.e., where or how to live, or, for some, whether to live at all). The other side of the dilemma is termed "membership" to draw attention to the fact that host states view themselves as rightly restricting or allowing movement into their borders/societies in order to maximize advantages for its own citizens/members. Irregular migrants then are seen by Jordan and Duvell as dealing individually and collectively with the consequences of the clash of two competing self-interests (that of their own and their host societies) in their own lives. "Dealing" with an irregular status means adopting some kind of strategy.

In the chapter on the role of support organization, Jordan and Duvell refer to perceptible differences in the strategies of Turkish irregular migrants in the UK, on the one hand, and their Brazilian and Polish counterparts as a result of intervention by support organizations. Because the Turkish community are well served by their support organizations, Turkish irregular migrants have more probability of applying for asylum, often engaging immigration authorities in long drawn-out legal battles which have very low chances of succeeding. In contrast, Brazilian and Polish migrants, who have no comparable ethnic/community organizations, adopt a strategy of avoiding contacts with authorities as much as possible, i.e., living in relative clandestinity. They will most probably contact support organizations only when they are already in trouble with the police or immigration authorities.


Quotes

p. 3

Individuals move to seek advantages for themselves; so too states restrict (or allow) movement in order to maximize advantages for their own citizens. [You are dealing here with two kinds of self-interests (rights) = when these clash, how can you say which self-interest is more weighty?] "People who break migration rules (irregular migrants) must therefore be seen, individually and collectively, as acting to deal with the consequences of these struggles on their lives." [Deal with it! I don't like the implication here. But it articulates well the the thinking behind migration law.]

p. 4 "voting with the feet" theme ("exit option")

"Irregular migration is part of the emergence of transnational communities, but transnationalism itself must understood within a broader analysis of how individuals and groups respond to globalisation (xxx) - moving between communities, forming and joining associations, clubs and networks. More generally, it raises the question of whether such movements across jurisdictions and among groups represent an alternative to collective action and political participation within them. xxx What does it tell us about the relative payoffs of democratic activity and for 'voting with the feet' ...?

another rendition of this theme is found in Ansley 2005, 209: "mass migration...best appreciated as a kind of collective civil disobedience"

yet another is Sassen (2003) "counter geographies of globalization" referring to migration as "resistance to hardships" (cited in Lutz, Helma.2008. "Introduction:Migrant Domestic Workers in Europe," in Lutz, H., ed., Migration and Domestic Work: A European Perspective on a Global Theme. Hampshire, England/Burlington, VT, USA: Ashgate, p.3)

mobility vs. membership

In a globalized world, the state is less willing to make investments in welfare/redistributive policies because citizens can move (bring the benefits of their education, etc.) elsewhere. [True of both developed and developing countries.] This gives people more incentive to move (to take responsibility for their own welfare). [Yes, a case of self-fulfilling prophecy.]

p. 5

"clubs" - mobile people chose communities/countries as if they chose "clubs", going for "the most attractive bundle of collective goods they can afford" [a scathing remark which paints mobile people as disloyal/lacking deep commitment to a community/country]

p. 12 (gist of the argument)

the challenge is how to find a better balance between exit (right to move/voting with feet), voice (democratic participation), and loyalty (community commitment that is the prerequisite of welfare politics) = already the key problem of free movement within the EU

key chapters are: Chaps. 1, 10; read Chap. 6 (role of support organizations)

Chap 6

p. 158

"The problem with the strategy of focusing on arguing for asylum claims, and providing for those needs not met by public services, was that these agencies [support organization] have been caught up in a downward spiral of deteriorating standards, with ever more basic, crisis or destitution services. Instead of being able to advocate for better, more generous standards for their clientele, they have found themselves on the defensive, playing for time in appeal cases, or providing the bare minimum for people facing homelessness and hunger."

p. 167 (on the unenviable situation of asylum seekers in the UK)

"In many ways, a dispassionate observer looking at our data might advise a migrant wishing to enter the UK for any reason to avoid the status of asylum seeker if this was in any way feasible for him or her and opt instead for complete illegality. Inspite of the vast amount of advice, assistance and representation being provided for asylum applicants, and considerable sums of public spending (very little of which reached them as individuals), their situation is extremely unenviable."